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So many papers on Administrative Law have been published that
a further contribution seems "old stuff," but zeal for the cause of judi-
cial review of administrative findings of fact impels renewal of some
argument on that point.
Administrative agencies, state and federal, are multitudinous, and
what is the advisable scope of judicial review as to one, or a number of
them, may not be so as to others. In a short paper referring to such tri-
bunals as a whole, generalities and dogmatism are unavoidable.
All fact-finders on conflicting evidence are fallible. "Findings of
fact" give administrative agencies the occasion, and often the excuse, for
the exercise of power over an individual. Such findings may be inaccu-
rate or false. A board with good intentions may unwittingly injure a
respondent needlessly. Again, misfeasance and malfeasance in office is
encouraged because seldom suspected. Many officials are unduly flattered
while countervailing facts are undisclosed or disbelieved. Incompetency,
malice or arbitrary conduct of some bureaucrats can be concealed from
the general public by the pretense of exercising "discretion."' Many men
do, or would, abuse authority. That is why we honor the exceptions,
and Ingersoll appropriately said: "It is the glory of Lincoln that, having
almost absolute power, he never abused it, except upon the side of
mercy.
Actualities as indicated by the factual situations and orders in some
proceedings, and the possibilities thereby suggested, furnish rational,
and inspire emotional, support for a much broader system of review th an
that involved in the predominant practice of giving finality to adminis-
trative findings whenever there is some evidence, however, weak, in their
favor.
Many factors contribute to the need of checks upon the fact-finding
powers of administrators. The power to make conclusive findings
where there is evidence both ways is "of enormous consequence,"' and
obviously the power may be misused or abused where wielded by officials
whose fitness is impaired by unstable tenure, political or group pressure,
or the necessity of conducting an investigation as, or from the viewpoint
of, a complainant. Where the administrator has acted as prosecutor or
in some other capacity incompatible with that of an impartial judge,
disqualifying thoughts and emotions enter into the process of arriving
at the expressed decision on the facts. Where influential officials or
*Of the Denver Bar.
'Chief Justice Hughes, Feb. 11, 1931: see 17 A. B. A. Journal, 237, 238.
Accord. Elihu Root, 41 A. B. A. Rep. 355, 369 (1916).
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groups manifest a desire for a particular result, the examiner or commis-
sioner may ostensibly become accordant, and find as if he is, though truth
and justice would dictate a contrary result. The psychological determi-
nants of his judgment may be opposed to the interests of the humble,
weak or inarticulate. While he has no pecuniary interest and apparently
is only trying to do his duty, there is nevertheless "a tendency to decide
on the basis of matters not before the tribunal or on evidence not pro-
duced, " 2 or only on that part of the evidence which supports the wishes
of a party or pressure group with whom he is in secret sympathy or fears
to offend. Most of the decisions which aggrieve parties are not upon
legal questions but upon facts as they exist or are "found" to be.
The "defects of administrative justice"' are such that a board may
needlessly oppress an economic interest, or unjustly deprive a citizen of
the right to carry on his usual occupation, or in some other way burden
a respondent, not by the old-fashioned judicial methods which safe-
guard rights and seek the truth, but by "ignoring the weight of the evi-
dence," or, without familiarity with the evidence, adopting recommen-
dations of prejudiced examiners. Bureaucratic tyranny can best be pre-
vented or discouraged by the right to judicial reexamination of the factual
basis of the administrative action, in some cases by an independent com-
mission, but generally by the courts. The latter should be empowered
to enforce their own views of the relative weight of the evidence. The
prevailing system of giving finality to facts which have some evidence in
their support makes false findings also effective if coming within the rule,
and that is making the innocent suffer. When, with no right to effective
review, an individual is penalized by an order based. on findings which
untruthfully, possibly libelously, describe his conduct, he, family and
friends become embittered against the acting tribunal and others of its
class. The memory of any kind of a judicial or administrative lynching
tortures its victim for life.
Findings on non-technical evidence.
While administrators or deputies who personally conduct hearings
are as qualified as veniremen for ascertaining ultimate facts, still condi-
tions increasing reliability of verdicts are absent with respect to findings.
With no challenge, either leremptory or for cause, parties must accept
the administrative triers of fact as they find them. A board's personnel
is practically unchanging, and hearings teand to become "perfunctory
routine, ' ' 4 and there is indifference to exact truth or consequences to indi-
viduals. On the other band, jurors serve for brief periods, and while on
duty they bestow undivided and critical attention to the testimony and
its givers. They remain separated from persons interested in the result.
'1938 Report, Special Committee on Administrative Law, A. B. A., 63 A. B. A.
Rep. 331, 347.
'Ibid.. p. 346.
'1938 Report, Sp. Comm. Adms. L., A. B. A.
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They must agree without compromise, and upon preponderance of the
evidence. The jury is the most dependable discoverer of truth on con-
flicting evidence, and yet persons with just causes are often so fearful of
adverse results before a jury that they avoid any adversary proceeding.
Something that hinders accurate fact-finding does get into the jury box,
but much is kept out. If even good juries intermittently err, boards will
do worse.
If a fact-finding board resembles the equity judge more than it does
the jury, the fact remains, as previously pointed out, that the board i's
apt to have disqualifying attributes which the judge has not, and admin-
istrators are often beset by outside influences which would not approach
a court. Reasons for the necessity of having the "findings of fact of a
trained equity or admiralty judge subject to complete review- 5 apply
also to the findings of a commissioner who is "many things that a judge
is not, and is not many things that a judge is,"" particularly in care to
avoid acting upon untested factual assumptions.
Findings on technical evidence.
Where a board deals with matters where it must make expert inter-
pretation of data which are intrinsically uncontroverted, it is in the posi-
tion of a judge who must find on technical evidence. Reasons for judicial
review on the facts still remain, even where the administrator is more
expert than the judge. Even a non-expert is capable of criticizing the
findings of an expert for the reason, among others, that to test findings
already formulated requires less expertness than to originate them. If
the reviewing court regards the commission as impartial and expert, the
original determination, unless clearly wrong, would be affi'rmed, and the
results of good administrative work preserved. The power to modify
or reverse, on the facts, would be rarely exercised, but should exist because
its potentialiies discourage erroneous, careless or arbitrary action on the
part of boards judicially correctible.
Questions still timely as to state boards.
The prevailing practice through the nation is not only to deny a
trial de novo but also a review on the facts where a party aggrieved by an
administrative order takes a statutory appeal or brings certiorari. The
courts are compelled to affirm an order, unless questions of law require
the contrary, if there is any evidence to support the findings of fact. This
permits judicial sloth. Thus a judge without reading the transcript can
safely pretend that he has done so and found "substantial" evidence sup-
porting the order complained of. But if, as he is presumed to do and
generally does, he actually reads the record, he is then able to say, sin-
cerely, not only whether there is some evidence on the side of the findings,
but also whether or not the preponderance or weight is also accordant.
'Vanderbilt, 23 A. B. A. J. 871, 873 (1937).
8Vanderbilt, 24 A. B. A. J. 267, 271 (1938).
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No additional time or labor is required for the determination of that
further question. This situation refutes the argument that a review on
the facts, as in the equity practice, would unduly burden the court and
cause delay. If the honest and diligent judge examines the whole record
carefully to decide legal questions, including those requiring some famil-
iarity with the evidence, his court should not be paralyzed to reverse on
'discovery of an injustice scantily clad in contradicted evidence. Yet there
is legislation thus limiting the power of reviewing courts. The "little
Wagner acts," for example, contain the provision that "the findings of
the board as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive."'
Where a state agency determines issues of fact arising between two
private parties, as in Workmen's Compensation cases, there is some excuse
for giving finality to the administrative findings, but not so where the
agency itself or a pressure group is assailing or investigating an individual.
In such cases horse sense perceives, and dietates keeping or securing, the
advantages which individuals have in a system whereby determinations
of issues of fact as well as of law are made, if not initially at least finally,
by an independent and specially qualified tribunal, restricted to adjudi-
cating (not also investigating) functions. That system tends to insure
fairness and conformity to the truth.
With respect to some state agencies, trials de novo ought to be avail-
able, as illustrated by a North Carolina case where a physician whose
license was revoked could appeal to a court and have a jury trial.8 In
Washington such physician could have a trial de novo to the court. '
Ordinarily, however, only a review on the facts is enough. It is not
impractical. There is, or was, a statute in New York under which an
assessment for taxation could be contested on the ground of overvalua-
tion, and testimony taken by a reviewing court.10 Statutory certiorari
or other kind of review can empower a court to pass upon the weight of
the evidence."
To foster administrative absolutism by retaining and enacting
statutes which give finality to findings of boards is to weaken apprecia-
tion, and imperil possession, of constitutional liberties which only the
courts steadfastly guard, and these tribunals are crippled by the statutes
in question. Sponsors of such statutes do not contemplate this situa-
tion, but desire only that their pet boards have as much power as
possible. The writing of some theorists, professors, and bureaucrats
favor limitation of judicial control, assuming that commissioners are
always impartial and expert. Hence the bar must remain the chief
defender and preserver of adequate judicial review, and thereby of the
constitutional system and rights which such review protects.
7See section 11 (f), Chapter 55, Laws of Utah (1937).
'Board v. Carroll, 138 S. E. 339.
'Board v. Macy, 159 Pac. 801.
"0Freund, Administrative Powers, etc., 269.
"Peo. v. Gibbons, 231 N. Y. 171.
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